Purpose: This study re-examines the extent to which municipally-owned entities (MOEs) engage in earnings management around the time of local elections.
Design/methodology/approach: The study analyses the total revenue figures for 506 unlisted Italian MOEs from 2009 to 2014 using Benford’s law to detect signs of low data quality or manipulated numbers in financial statements.
Findings: The findings reveal that entities owned by local governments engage in earnings management practices during pre-electoral seasons, which is consistent with the political cost hypothesis. Accounting numbers are rounded to the closest key cognitive reference point by overusing and underusing specific revenue digits. This aligns with the performance expectations hypothesis as well.
Originality/value: This study adds evidence to the existing issue of earnings man- agement in the public sector during elections by using a less conventional approach, highlighting the need for increased transparency in financial reporting before these critical periods.
Practical implications: Auditors, forensic accountants, and judicial bodies that en- deavour to protect public finances can also employ Benford’s law to scrutinise the financial statements of hybrid entities at such times.
Keywords: Benford’s law, cosmetic earnings management, forensic accounting, lo- cal elections, municipally-owned entities, public sector accounting
