In this paper, I analyse the evolution of corporate reporting regulation in Europe in the last two decades and reflect on the possibility that the traditional usefulness ap- proach is insufficient to solve new issues arising from the current regulatory land- scape. The evolvement that the concept of “public interest” has undergone within the European Commission implies a change in the objective of corporate reporting from the main aim of targeting investors for decision-making through a change brought about by the financial crisis to the aim of financial stability and economic growth, and finally to the goal of getting of social and environmental objectives. This evolvement implies a revolution, raises non-previous existing conflicts of in- terest among stakeholders, and brings a motivating challenge for researchers. How- ever, in many cases, the existence of a potential crisis of incentives to publish in journals with a “real” impact on academia and to transfer research output to society requires a profound debate for progress.
Keywords: public interest, corporate reporting, accounting paradigm, researchers’ incentives
